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Abstract
Realists and non-ideal theorists currently criticise Rawlsian mainstream liberal-
ism for its inability to address injustice and political conflict, as a result of the sub-
ordination of political philosophy to moral theory (Bernard Williams), as well as 
an idealising and abstract methodology (Charles W. Mills). Seeing that liberalism 
emerged as a theory for the protection of the individual from conflict and injustice, 
these criticisms aim at the very core of liberalism as a theory of the political and 
therefore deserve close analysis. I will defend Judith N. Shklar’s liberalism of fear as 
an answer to these challenges. I will argue that the liberalism of fear maintains real-
ism’s conflictual and inherently political thrust while also integrating a perspective 
on injustice. I will defend the claim that in contrast to the two aforementioned criti-
cisms, the liberalism of fear develops its own normative standard from which politi-
cal arrangements can be assessed. It does so by replacing the idealising approach to 
political philosophy with a non-utopian methodology, which opens a negative per-
spective on what is to be avoided in the political sphere, and how to detect and deal 
with injustice. Due to this standard, it is a liberal theory that is uniquely able to meet 
the realist and non-ideal challenge.
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Rawls—Too Big to Fail?
In what has come to be diagnosed as the ‘crisis of liberalism’ (Kreide 2016), the 
writings of Judith N. Shklar have been discovered as an alternative approach to lib-
eral theory, and praised by some (Gatta 2018) as a liberal theory of the political able 
to deal with the political problems of the twenty-first century.
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While liberalism is not a monolithic theory and unites different versions under 
its tenet, all liberal theories share a core premise: namely, the normative primacy of 
individual liberty, which serves as a basis for concepts of legitimate political author-
ity (Gaus et al. 2018). Despite its theoretical diversity, liberal theorising has come 
to almost exclusively focus on John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice (Rawls 2003). This 
monograph has become the quasi-archimedian point of reference of liberal debate 
since 1971. Here, Rawls develops the concept of a hypothetical original position, in 
which rational and autonomous subjects choose two fundamental principles of jus-
tice for liberal societies (Rawls 2003, § 40). Despite significant changes Rawls made 
from the Theory of Justice to Political Liberalism, the Kantian concept of autonomy 
remains crucial for Rawls’s approach (Freeman 2016) and, as a result, for liberal 
debate as such. The most recent criticisms of Rawlsian theory, realism and non-ideal 
theory, both maintain the liberal core premise, but put forward a thorough criticism 
of Rawlsian theory, especially its conceptual and methodological aspects.
Political Conflict
The realist critique of Rawlsian liberalism, most notably put forward by Bernard 
Williams (2005a, b), argues that contemporary liberalism is incapable of conceptu-
alising genuinely political notions such as power and conflict due to its reliance on 
a specific conceptualisation of rationality and the resulting subordination of politi-
cal philosophy to moral philosophy. Williams is particularly concerned with the fact 
that while Rawls’s Theory of Justice and its modification in Political Liberalism is 
in defence of a theory capable of dealing with the political sphere, both concep-
tions are in fact entirely apolitical. Rawls himself highlights the fact that the core of 
his theory, the original position, is a ‘procedural interpretation of Kant’s conception 
of autonomy and the Categorical Imperative within an empirical theory’ (2003, p. 
226). It is precisely this collapse of political philosophy into moral philosophy that 
Williams criticises as ‘political moralism’ (2005a, p. 2). In Williams’s terms, politi-
cal moralism assumes ‘the priority of the moral over the political’ (Williams 2005a, 
p. 2). In spite of the modifications in Political Liberalism, realist critics argue that 
political liberalism continues to be based on a Kantian idea: namely the idea that 
self-legislation as the only legitimation of political authority that is compatible with 
individual freedom (Sleat 2013). Political liberalism consequently rests on the idea 
of public justification based on public reason. This results in liberalism’s ‘consen-
sus vision of the political’ (Sleat 2013, p. 14; see also Sagar 2016, p. 380), because 
political authority needs to be acceptable to each person subject to it. Hypotheti-
cal consensus regarding public justification is liberalism’s ‘moral lodestar’ (Macedo 
1991, p. 78). Therefore, the underlying consensus regarding the moral conception 
of the person as well as public reason must be prior to politics itself, and is ‘in an 
important sense non-political’ (Sleat 2013, p. 39).
For realists, this result begs the question how this version of political liberal-
ism deals with the simple fact that not all actual persons share the moral prem-
ise that all persons are free and equal; a premise on which the liberal project 
essentially relies. The question arises if their rejection of this premise affects the 
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legitimacy of the liberal state, which nonetheless continues to coerce them (Sleat 
2013, p. 35). Since public justification demands only that the liberal principle of 
justification is hypothetically acceptable to reasonable free and equal persons, the 
standard liberal answer will be negative. Realist theorists are not content with this 
answer, due to its incapacity to deal with the dimensions of conflict and power 
which are seen as ineradicable aspects of the political.
In contrast to Rawls, Williams develops his account of ‘political realism’ (Wil-
liams 2005a, p. 3); a genuinely political philosophy that operates independently 
from moral principles: ‘political philosophy is not just applied moral philosophy, 
[…]. In particular, political philosophy must use distinctive political concepts, 
such as power, and its normative relative, legitimation’ (Williams 2005b, p. 77). 
Political realists argue that political legitimacy is not derivable from a rationally 
justifiable moral principle, but consists both of an answer to the ‘first political 
question of order, protection, safety, trust and the conditions of cooperation’, 
i.e. the state of nature, and in addition a justification of this answer. Each such 
‘answer’—that is, each instance of political authority that aims to resolve the 
first political question—must be justified (and justifiable) to those subject to it. 
This is what Williams calls the ‘basic legitimation demand’, or ‘BLD’ (Williams 
2005a, p. 3). Williams introduces the additional requirement that the acceptance 
of the legitimating account cannot itself be the result of force (what he terms 
the ‘critical theory principle’). However, what makes sense as a legitimation var-
ies depending on the context (it ‘makes sense’ under specific historical circum-
stances), and is not definable from a purely hypothetical original position (Wil-
liams 2005a, p. 10). The purpose of the BLD is to distinguish the ‘problem’, the 
first political question, i.e. the state of nature, from the ‘solution’, i.e. legitimate 
political authority (Williams 2005a, p. 5). Merely successful domination is not 
a ‘political situation’, and, consequently, does not establish legitimate political 
authority (Williams 2005a, p. 5).
Since political and moral questions follow different functional imperatives, the 
mere application of moral categories to political questions is inadequate for under-
standing the political sphere. This is especially the case for the dimension of conflict 
that is inherent to the political. Political conflict cannot be fully understood within a 
primarily moral, consensus-based framework. The difference between political and 
moral conflict relates back to Williams’s rejection of Rawlsian ‘moralism’: Rawls’s 
theory relies on a Kantian, i.e. rationalist, framework for solving what, according to 
Williams, are essentially moral questions. This approach cannot be applied to the 
political, since political and moral opposition differ in two respects: content and 
scope. First, political conflicts are not conflicts about moral questions or reasons:
political difference is of the essence of politics, and political difference is a 
relation of political opposition, rather than, in itself, a relation of intellectual 
or interpretive disagreement. […] the relations of political opposition cannot 
simply be understood in terms of intellectual error. (Williams 2005a, p. 78)
 Political difference or opposition can therefore not sensibly be resolved through 
a process of ideal reasoning, since other, non-moral considerations like personal 
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interests will play a crucial role in the decision. Therefore, political conflicts 
cannot always be solved consensually. Second, political conflicts have a differ-
ent scope than moral conflicts: ‘Political disagreement is identified by a field of 
application—eventually, about what should be done under political authority, in 
particular through the deployment of state power’ (Williams 2005a, p. 78). In 
contrast to moral conflict, political conflict always takes place against the back-
drop of a political authority that is entitled and even required to enforce political 
decisions through its monopoly on violence. The conceptual framework of politi-
cal moralism, however, does not offer any space for this kind of opposition or dif-
ference, seeing that its moral premises are seen as universally acknowledged and 
reasonable. Given these premises, the type of conflict that realists point to cannot 
even arise.
It is important to note that contemporary realism neither rejects liberal values nor 
the importance of morality for politics per se. Williams acknowledges that liberal-
ism is the only acceptable legitimating story for modern societies (2005a, p. 10), 
i.e. the only such story that ‘makes sense’ to citizens of modern societies. He admits 
that the strength of liberalism lies in the fact that it is indeed, first, an ‘acceptable’ 
answer to the BLD (Williams 2005a: 8), and second, that it raises the standards of 
acceptable answers to the BLD by ‘rais[ing] the standards of what counts as being 
disadvantaged’ (Williams 2005a, p. 7)—i.e. the standards that a political authority 
is supposed to ensure for each individual. Any legitimate political authority must 
protect its subjects from being ‘radically disadvantaged’ in ‘the basic Hobbesian 
terms of coercion, pain, torture, humiliation, suffering, death’ (Williams 2005a, p. 
4). Liberal states, however, introduce ‘more demanding standards of what counts as 
a threat to people’s vital interests’ (Williams 2005a, p. 7). In particular, liberalism 
bans ‘hierarchical structures which generate disadvantage’ (Williams 2005a, p. 7).
So political realism need not reject liberalism or the importance of morality. 
Nonetheless, realism has often been criticised for its ambiguous normative status 
for two reasons (see Sleat 2010). First of all, due to this close connection of histori-
cal circumstances and political theory, realism has been accused of having a ‘status 
quo bias’ (Rossi 2016). It blurs the critical distance of theory and mere political 
circumstances, and hence risks losing the progressive and emancipatory potential 
that the normative core of liberal theory represents. Second, while Williams rejects 
the idea of morality as a guide for politics, the BLD and the critical theory principle 
both seem to have a moral content themselves. Since the mere subjection of persons 
under a political order is rejected as illegitimate, it can be argued that he implicitly 
relies on moral principles regarding the question of what free and equal persons owe 
to each other. In this respect, contemporary realism and liberalism are not that far 
apart.
Against the second objection, Sagar argues that the normativity Williams sug-
gests is of its own kind, since the BLD is meant to distinguish politics from mere 
coercion and war. While an answer to the BLD must be given, this answer need not 
be accepted unanimously or consensually by all who are coerced. However, as soon 
as there is a BLD, ‘politics is happening’ (Sagar 2016, p. 371). This establishes a 
genuinely political normativity that does not rely on previous moral considerations, 
but emerges as a reaction to the ‘first political question’. Consequently, the realist 
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conception opens space for political conflict and negotiation about the BLD without 
presupposing the necessity of a universal consensus. This makes possible a distinc-
tion between political legitimacy, deriving from an answer to the first political ques-
tion, and moral rightness in Kantian terms. While Rawlsian liberalism and realism 
both accept that a given political authority can be legitimate despite some people 
rejecting it, only realism accepts that the people rejecting it can do so for good polit-
ical (if non-moral) reasons, i.e. without being irrational and therefore ‘wrong’.
In spite of the normative ambiguity of the BLD, Williams’s account puts the rela-
tion of the political and the moral back into the centre of liberal political theorising. 
Williams does not deny that political and moral questions can be closely linked, yet 
his approach allows us to conceptualise the liberal state as a coercive state: even a 
liberal state can—and must—coerce its citizens into conforming with certain rules 
in specific domains of their lives for the purpose of social coordination and in order 
to guarantee order and stability (see also Sleat 2013). What is more, the enforc-
ing nature of the state creates the potential for the abuse of power, an aspect of the 
political that Rawls’s political moralism seems unable to conceptualise, despite his 
efforts to address non-ideal situations, such as when civil disobedience is called for 
in response to unjust legislation. Therefore, the conceptual gap that realism identi-
fies in liberal theory is the failure to integrate the dimension of power and conflict 
into its conception of the political, while at the same time political realism wants 
to preserve liberalism’s core commitment, the normative primacy of individual lib-
erty. However, the realist methodology itself is not sufficient to provide this norma-
tive standard. I will argue that Shklar’s liberalism is able to integrate the concerns 
of realist theory, but avoids the imprecision regarding the normative status of her 
conception by providing her own, explicitly normative principle, which nonetheless 
proceeds independent of moral theory.
Political Injustice
The realist concern with the conceptualisation of conflict is complemented by the 
non-ideal critique of contemporary, ideal liberalism. While realists ask if liberalism 
offers an adequate conceptualisation of the conflictual political sphere, non-ideal 
theory mainly concerns itself with the methodological resources for understanding 
injustice within the liberal paradigm. While realist and non-ideal theory differ in 
their conceptual approach to liberalism, the conceptualisation of political conflict 
and injustice are related issues, since it is implausible to assume that something can 
be unjust without there also being a related or underlying conflict. Despite this prox-
imity of realist and non-ideal thinking, they are marked by a crucial difference in 
their respective approach to liberalism: realism is critical of political moralism as 
such, whereas non-ideal theory essentially relies on the Rawlsian distinction of ideal 
and non-ideal theory and hence defends a version of ‘political moralism’.
Charles W. Mills, a prominent proponent of non-ideal theory, argues that Rawl-
sian ideal theory is abstracting away from precisely those domains of the social and 
political life in which injustices are most likely to occur, and about which a liberal 
theory of justice should not be silent given its normative commitment. In particular, 
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ideal theorising results in an insufficient understanding of sexist, classist, and rac-
ist discrimination, and consequently cannot offer any solutions for these problems 
(Mills 2005. For a similar criticism of Rawls, see Okin 1989). Like Williams, Mills 
supports the core liberal principles of freedom and equality, but argues that they 
need to be arrived at differently, namely through non-ideal theory: ‘I would like to 
suggest that a nonideal approach is also superior to an ideal approach in being bet-
ter able to realize the ideals, by virtue of realistically recognizing the obstacles to 
their acceptance and implementation’ (Mills 2005, p. 187). Non-ideal theory still 
works with abstraction and idealisation, but in a more apt way than ideal theory. 
This is because Rawlsian ideal theory (or ‘ideal-as-idealized’ theory; Mills 2005, p. 
167), develops a ‘model of how P should actually work’, be it ‘a perfect vacuum, a 
frictionless plane’ (Mills 2005, p. 167), or, as in the case of political philosophy, an 
ideally just society. Non-ideal theory, on the other hand, develops a ‘model of how 
P actually works’ (ibid.), by maintaining ‘P’s crucial aspects (its essential nature) 
and how it actually works (its basic dynamic)’ (Mills 2005, p. 166). Since ideal 
theory develops a model of how a just society should ideally look like, it abstracts 
away from actual—and often not perfectly just—societies’ basic dynamic, especially 
regarding the crucial six aspects: it presupposes an idealised social ontology, ideal-
ised capacities, silence on oppression, ideal social institutions, an idealised cogni-
tive sphere, and strict compliance (Mills 2005, pp. 168–169); all of them conditions 
never found in the ‘real’ world, in which injustice needs to be dealt with. These 
idealisations lead to an inadequate theoretical focus for the conceptualisation of (in)
justice. Non-ideal theory, too, works with abstraction: class, gender, and race as 
paradigm cases of hierarchical social relationships are abstractions of the non-ideal 
type which are said to mirror the social realities of societies that are not perfectly 
or ideally just. It is important to note that none of these cleavages of discrimination 
are fully understandable without their historical background. For example, urgent 
political problems such as racism in the United States are not even understandable 
with the tools of ideal theory, seeing that the original position is conceptualised as 
hypothetical and ahistorical. Therefore, ideal theory is not sufficient for dealing with 
concrete instances of injustice. Since it is concerned with the justification of abstract 
principles of justice, its pre-established grid is too wide for grasping the complex-
ities of deviations from these principles. Here, Mills’s critique mirrors the realist 
interest trying to recover the relevant information that is made invisible through 
ideal theory.
Although Mills’s critique of Rawls is less radical than Williams’s, given its con-
tinuation of the politically moralist outlook, Mills’s account, too, runs into problems 
regarding its own normative status. While Mills is not criticising political moralism 
as such, the moral judgements on which his criticism relies in fact need to fulfil the 
criteria of universality and impartiality (Hampshire 1978). If universalisation is to 
be possible at all, it is necessary to abstract away from the specific characteristics of 
the situation. Therefore, ideal-as-descriptive theory has to rely on the ideal, ideal-as-
idealised theory, in the way Rawls suggested, such that non-ideal theory is a second 
step in which particular obstacles to realising justice are taken into consideration 
(e.g. Goodhart 2018; Sleat 2013). Giving up Rawls’s ideal methodology is hence 
not sensible given Mills’s own goals. What is missing from liberal theory thus is an 
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approach that is able to deal with concrete instances of injustice, while preserving 
liberalism’s normative core commitment. Here, non-ideal theory runs into the same 
problems as realism does: neither of these approaches provides an independent nor-
mative standard based on which political arrangements can be criticised. The liber-
alism of fear, on the other hand, goes further than these two approaches by develop-
ing its own normative principle: the avoidance of the summum malum.
It has become clear that the contemporary critiques of liberalism primarily 
address conceptual and methodological questions, not the normative core premise of 
the primacy of individual liberty. The idealising approach to political philosophy has 
been criticised for not being able to conceptualise the political as independent from 
morality, resulting in an incapacity to conceptualise conflict and a blind spot regard-
ing political injustice. However, regarding their respective normative standards, both 
the non-ideal and realist critique face the same difficulty: both depend on a standard 
that is prior to their theories. Non-ideal theory relies on the normative standard pro-
vided by ideal theory, and realism relies on the implicit moral assumption that coer-
cion needs to be justified and justifiable to those subject to it, which it is unable to 
derive from its own historically embedded assumptions. It is the strength and origi-
nality of the liberalism of fear to combine the conceptual desiderata made visible 
through the two criticisms discussed above with a distinctively normative outlook.
The Liberalism of Fear
I will defend Judith Shklar’s liberalism of fear as a useful way of rethinking lib-
eralism, arguing that it offers a radically different conceptual and methodological 
approach as well as an independent and explicitly normative viewpoint, which sets it 
apart from other contemporary critiques of liberalism (see Kaufmann 2019). Relat-
ing back to the deficits of liberal theory discussed above, I will argue that the liber-
alism of fear is able to close the conceptual gaps that Rawlsian ideal liberalism has 
left liberal theory with. I will highlight that the liberalism of fear represents a genu-
inely realist version of liberalism, since it proceeds from the ‘first political question’ 
independent of any moral theory (for a reading of Shklar as a realist see also Sabl 
(2011) and Sleat (2013)). I will argue that it transcends realism by developing its 
own normative standard, and hence remains a realist version of liberal theory. Sec-
ond, due to its non-utopian methodology, it is better able to avoid the blind spots 
regarding injustice.
Non‑Utopian Liberalism
Like all liberal theories, the liberalism of fear embraces the normative core of the 
primacy of individual liberty. However, compared to the standard theories of lib-
eralism, Shklar employs a radically different methodology. For this purpose, she 
first spells out and criticises the implicit premises of the paradigm liberal theo-
ries—namely, the liberalism of natural rights, associated with John Locke, and 
the liberalism of self-development, associated with John Stuart Mill. She argues 
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that both implicitly rely on an idealising dynamic that results in an implausible 
picture of the political. In particular, the focus on natural rights in the Lockean 
tradition entails ‘that a perfect or optimal society would be composed only of 
rights claiming citizens’ (Shklar 1989, p. 26). The liberalism of personal devel-
opment assumes that individuals realise their potential primarily through educa-
tion, which is why, on this account, ‘politics and government’ would eventually 
become unnecessary (Shklar 1989, p. 27). Avant la lettre, Shklar starts from the 
non-ideal claim that the chances of establishing a perfect, rights-based society, 
as well as a society composed of self-perfecting citizens are rather slim, and 
thus such idealising approaches to political problems inadequate. She explic-
itly emphasises that her approach is ‘non-utopian’, as she rejects ideal theory as 
implausible. Instead of making idealising assumptions about the hypothetical 
capacities of ideal citizens, Shklar wants to recover the initial thrust of liberal 
theory by looking at its history. She emphasises that liberalism emerged as a the-
ory for resolving profound political conflict, and protecting the individual from 
certain kinds of mistreatment (Shklar 1989, p. 23). The reason why persons need 
to be protected from conflict and mistreatment, however, is not that they are ide-
ally rational, rights-claiming citizens or individuals capable of perfecting them-
selves, but rather because as human beings, they are fundamentally vulnerable. 
Hence, the liberalism of fear is ‘entirely nonutopian’ (Shklar 1989, p. 26):
it does not, to be sure, offer a summum bonum towards which all political 
agents should strive, but it certainly does begin with a summum malum, 
which all of us know and would avoid if only we could. That evil is cruelty 
and the fear it inspires, and the very fear of fear itself. To that extent the lib-
eralism of fear makes a universal and especially a cosmopolitan claim, as it 
historically always has done. (Shklar 1989, p. 29)
 The non-utopian thrust entails a negative methodology, which is crucial for 
understanding the fundamental thrust of the liberalism of fear. Rather than striv-
ing for a summum bonum that ought to be realised, the liberalism of fear proceeds 
negatively—by identifying the summum malum, the worst evil that ought to be 
avoided. According to Shklar, all human beings want to avoid cruelty and fear:
Of fear it can be said that it is universal as it is physiological. It is a mental 
as well as a physical reaction, and it is common to animals as well as to 
human beings. To be alive is to be afraid, and much to our advantage in 
many cases, since alarm often preserves us from danger. The fear we fear is 
of pain inflicted by others who kill and maim us, not the natural and healthy 
fear that merely warns us of avoidable pain. And, when we think politically, 
we are afraid not only for ourselves but for our fellow citizens as well. We 
fear a society of fearful people. (Shklar 1989, p. 29)
What is meant by cruelty here? It is a deliberate infliction of physical, and 
secondarily emotional, pain upon a weaker person or group by stronger ones 
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 The liberalism of fear aims at the avoidance of the summum malum for human 
beings, which Shklar identifies as ‘cruelty and the fear it inspires’, as well as ‘fear 
of fear’; notions that she does not define in great detail but which will be analysed 
more closely in the following. The negative methodology of the avoidance of the 
summum malum is justified based on the assumption that the political setting cre-
ates circumstances in which fear for oneself and for others is an adequate reac-
tion. This focus points to the purpose of the liberal state: the protection of the 
individual. Hence, the negative, non-utopian methodology paves the way for the 
realist concern, the solution of the first political question. It can even be said that 
the first political question only arises given the fundamental need for protection, 
which can only be given precedence through a non-utopian, negative approach.
The Asymmetrical Structure of the Political
In accordance with classical liberal social contract theory, Shklar defends the liberal 
state as the best method of protecting individuals, and individual rights as the best 
tool for realising this protection. Consequently, liberalism ‘has only one overriding 
aim: to secure the political conditions that are necessary for the exercise of personal 
freedom. […] That belief is the original and only defensible meaning of liberalism’ 
(Shklar 1989, p. 21). Other than that, ‘liberalism does not have any particular posi-
tive doctrines about how people are to conduct their lives or what personal choices 
they are to make’ (Shklar 1989, p. 21). As a consequence of the primacy of indi-
vidual liberty, the distinction between the public and the private sphere becomes a 
necessary characteristic of any liberal theory. The protection of individual liberty 
and the private sphere is ensured by the ‘original first principle of liberalism, the 
rule of law [which] […] is the prime instrument to restrain governments’ (Shklar 
1989, p. 37).
The liberalism of fear’s focus on the importance of political power clearly marks 
its realist thrust. One of realism’s core concerns is the role of power in the politi-
cal sphere (Galston 2010). Shklar’s proximity to and influence in realist theory have 
been widely acknowledged (Sabl 2011; Sleat 2013), especially by Williams (2005b), 
who explicitly draws on her liberalism of fear. However, I will defend the claim that 
Shklar’s liberalism of fear goes further than realist theories in not only emphasis-
ing the relevance of power and conflict in the political sphere. Shklar establishes an 
independent normative standard that sets her theory apart from realist theory. This 
normative standard allows her to avoid the status-quo bias of realist theory, while at 
the same time her focus on power enables her to integrate realist concerns into her 
own approach. Hence, her approach remains within the liberal paradigm, but incor-
porates the concerns of realism.
In Shklar’s theory, the focus on power is a logical consequence of starting from 
the position of weakness in the political setting rather than idealised capacities, i.e. 
of the negative, non-utopian approach. In agreement with political realism, Shklar 
draws attention to the fact that political power, even in a liberal state, can always 
become part of the problem it is meant to solve: ‘The liberalism of fear […] regards 
abuses of public power in all regimes with equal trepidation’ (Shklar 1989, p. 28. 
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Williams 2005b analyses this aspect of realism in close detail.) What the liberalism 
of fear emphasises is the fact that state power is not simply a neutral agency that 
impartially protects rights. On the contrary, in order to be able to fulfil the purpose 
of protecting the individual, the liberal state must rely on a monopoly of violence, 
distributed across institutions such as the legal system, the police, and the military, 
which it needs in the first place to be able to assert political power. This simple 
fact, while necessary for the solution of the first political problem, also exposes citi-
zens to a potential threat. This threat consists in the fact that the establishment of 
a monopoly of violence is in itself not an alleviation of the first political problem, 
since there is the inherent potential of an abuse of power:
Given the inevitability of that military, police, and persuasive power which is 
called government, there is evidently always much to be afraid of. […] And 
the freedom it [the liberalism of fear] wishes to secure is freedom from the 
abuse of power and intimidation of the defenseless that this difference invites. 
(Shklar 1989, p. 27) [my addition]
 The liberalism of fear emphasises that the asymmetry of political power, which 
structures any political setting, does not cease to exist in a liberal state. The liberal-
ism of fear starts from the first political question of ‘order, protection, safety, trust 
and the conditions of cooperation’ (Williams 2005a, p. 3), and shares the liberal 
assumption that this question can be answered. However, it does not share the politi-
cally moralist assumption that the liberal state can never become part of the prob-
lem; something that realists criticise regarding the consensus-view versions of liber-
alism. The liberalism of fear argues that even the liberal solution of the first political 
problem does not eradicate the conflictual dynamic of the political. The asymmetry 
of power that is a necessary characteristic of any political authority can be part of 
the solution of the political problem just as much as it can be the problem itself. 
Given the focus on those whose ‘protection’ and ‘safety’ are at stake, it becomes 
clear that ‘For this liberalism [of fear] the basic units of political life are not discur-
sive and reflecting persons, nor friends and enemies, nor patriotic soldier-citizens, 
nor energetic litigants, but the weak and the powerful’ (Shklar 1989, p. 27 [my addi-
tion]). This observation about the structure of the political is independent of any 
moral theory: for example, the liberalism of fear ‘does not rest on a theory of moral 
pluralism’ (Shklar 1989, p. 29). Since it starts from a functionalist observation about 
the structure of the political, and does not rely on any predetermined moral standard, 
it is a genuinely political concept in Williams’s terms. It has already been observed 
for the liberalism of fear, the political sphere per se is constituted through the dichot-
omy of ‘weak’ and ‘powerful’, and this an important aspect that sets it apart from 
other liberal theories; it is a ‘liberalism from the margins’ (Gatta 2018, p. 118). For 
the liberalism of fear, the distinction of the ‘weak’ and the ‘powerful’ is the result of 
the necessary distinction between those who actually dispose of the means of coer-
cion and those who do not, and are consequently exposed to the inherent threat of 
an abuse of power, i.e. the solution turning into the first political problem. I claim 
that based on this distinction, Shklar’s concept of the asymmetrical political sphere 
is inherently conflictual, since it does not assume that the solution of the first politi-
cal problem establishes universal consensus and eradicates the possibility of conflict 
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once and for all. What is more, the functionalist perspective on the asymmetry of 
the political highlights the normative independence of Shklar’s approach from moral 
theory; rather than having to rely on ‘moral intuitions’, as some critics assume (see 
e.g. Sleat 2013, p. 106). Political power, even liberal political power, of necessity 
introduces a dichotomy of the ‘weak’ and the ‘powerful’—consequently, political 
power is something that is to be feared for good reasons. Hence, Shklar’s approach 
is driven by a realist concern.
Fear—A Normative Notion?
Shklar’s focus on the asymmetry of power is reflected in the core concepts of ‘fear’ 
and ‘cruelty’, which form the summum malum that ought to be avoided. Seeing that 
they carry the normative weight of Shklar’s liberalism, it is particularly problem-
atic that Shklar does not define them in greater detail. Since it seems like she is 
deriving normative statements from the description of physical pain, the concept 
of ‘fear’ has been criticised for representing a naturalistic fallacy (see e.g. Robin 
2004, p. 149). However, this allegation lacks plausibility, simply because Shklar 
does not only refer to fear of physical pain but introduces a more complex notion 
of fear. Recently, Bajohr (2019) has defended a highly illuminating reading of the 
terms of ‘fear’ and ‘cruelty’ that proves their normative potential while avoiding the 
naturalistic-fallacy-objection. Bajohr argues that Shklar in fact distinguishes a ‘pri-
mary and a secondary notion of fear’ (Bajohr 2019, p. 169), and which represent 
‘two distinct sources of normativity’ (Bajohr 2019, p. 168). The primary notion of 
fear is ‘empirical’ (Bajohr 2019, p. 170) and explicitly refers to the fear of physical 
pain, which, for Shklar, has universal status as the ‘summum malum, which all of 
us know’. The secondary notion of fear, on the other hand, is a ‘formal’ principle 
(Bajohr 2019, p. 170; see also Forrester 2012, p. 252 and Tamir 1997, p. 298). The 
recurring notion of the ‘fear of fear’ represents an abstraction away from the mere 
physical dimension: ‘the first “fear” would here denote the quality of the experi-
ence, the second its content’ (Bajohr 2019, p. 170). Consequently, ‘what the fear of 
fear is about does not have to be bound to any naturalistic constant but can change 
over time and expand its range beyond’ mere physical cruelty (Bajohr 2019, p. 170; 
see also Forrester 2012, p. 252). ‘Because the fear of fear is a reflexive argument, it 
can ensure its universality without resorting to a strong naturalism’ (Bajohr 2019, 
p. 170), and, hence, avoid the naturalistic fallacy. The precise content of the ‘fear of 
fear’ can vary, which is why Bajohr argues that the second principle entails a ‘con-
textual universalism’ (ibid.). Similarly, Gatta (2018, p. 115) argues that fear can con-
sist of different things in ‘different settings, situations, and cultural contexts’, which 
is why there is an ‘agon about what fear is’. This novel reading of fear as the sum-
mum malum is crucial for rebutting unjustified criticisms of Shklar, which overstate 
the primary notion of fear, and assume that her approach is unable to deal with more 
complex but politically important phenomena. Bajohr’s and Gatta’s readings prove 




In the following, I will draw on this multi-level analysis of the concept of ‘fear’ as 
a normative universalist notion in order to defend a ‘political’ reading of the terms 
‘cruelty’ and ‘fear’. I claim that the difference between the primary and secondary 
notion of fear becomes crucial in the political context. The empirical, primary notion 
of fear of physical pain is deemed ‘natural and healthy’, since it protects all animals 
from danger. As a result, the primary notion of fear is not necessarily relevant in the 
political sphere. Rather, in the political context that liberalism is addressing, the sec-
ondary notion of fear is specified as something that can be aroused by others, who 
are perceived as a potential threat. Yet it should be noted that Shklar does not defend 
a Hobbesian ‘homo homini lupus’—view of human nature or society. Although oth-
ers can constitute a threat, and consequently must under certain conditions fear each 
other, Shklar grants that individuals can also fear for others. Therefore, I argue that 
it is not the simple fact of persons living together that inspires political fear, but the 
political setting of the unequal distribution and asymmetry of power that inspires 
the ‘fear of fear’. It is important to note that the ‘political’, secondary notion of fear 
relates back to the realist thrust of the liberalism of fear: the necessary asymmetry of 
political power generates the idea that the basic units are the ‘weak’ and the ‘power-
ful’, rather than idealised, rights-claiming and rational subjects.
Further, I claim that the concept of ‘cruelty’, another essential parameter in her 
theory, reflects the realist focus on the asymmetry of power:
But public cruelty is not an occasional personal inclination. It is made possible 
by differences in public power, and it is almost always built into the system 
of coercion upon which all governments have to rely to fulfil their essential 
functions. A minimal level of fear is implied in any system of law, and the lib-
eralism of fear does not dream of an end of public, coercive government. The 
fear it does want to prevent is that which is created by arbitrary, unexpected, 
unnecessary, and unlicensed acts of force and by habitual and pervasive acts 
of cruelty and torture performed by military, paramilitary, and police agents in 
any regime. (Shklar 1989, p. 29)
 Like the political notion of fear, public cruelty, too, is explicitly qualified as a pos-
sible result of the dichotomy of ‘weak’ and ‘powerful’, which enables the latter to 
subject the former to their will. While this can also happen in the private (or any 
non-political) sphere, public cruelty is a political problem that liberalism needs to 
address. The possibility of public cruelty is a given in any regime, and even within 
a liberal one it results from the difference in status and power that the liberal state’s 
monopoly of violence entails. This setting results in the ‘fear of fear’ itself. There-
fore, I argue that given its awareness of the enforcing and even violent potential of 
state power, the liberalism of fear closes the conceptual gap regarding power, evi-
dent in Rawls’s ‘ideal theory’.
What is more, due to its focus on fear, Shklar’s negative, non-utopian approach 
not only avoids the apolitical conclusions of mainstream liberal theories, and proves 
the inherently realist thrust of her liberalism. The focus on fear also provides her 
with a normative standard for judging political arrangements. Drawing on this con-
clusion, I defend the claim that rather than resorting to ideal principles of justice 
decided on by hypothetical, ideally rational subjects, the normative standard of the 
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liberalism of fear is derived from the structure of the political itself. Since this nor-
mative standard is arrived at without resorting to theories of the moral or of rational-
ity, it is, as Shklar claims, compatible with various moral theories, without having to 
depend on any of them (Shklar 1989, pp.  29–30).
A Theory of Injustice?
The vision of the political on Shklar’s terms seems rather pessimistic, if not ‘dys-
topic’ (Benhabib 1996). Her suggestion for dealing with the conflictual political 
situation is, again, negative: The Faces of Injustice analyses the (epistemological) 
resources of conceptualising injustice. The negative approach—injustice rather than 
justice—is a result of the focus on unavoidable and irreducible conflict in the politi-
cal sphere. Injustice and fear are conceptually related, as Bajohr argues: the primary 
and secondary notions of fear ‘are closely intertwined with a third, transcendental 
principle, which describes conditions of the possibility for articulating a sense of 
injustice’ (Bajohr 2019, p. 168). Acknowledging the conceptual status and norma-
tive significance of the political notion of fear thus makes possible a liberal perspec-
tive on injustice: ‘This is where the third source of normativity comes in; after the 
empirical and the formal, it is a transcendental argument. It looks at the condition 
of the possibility for giving voice to one’s sense of injustice’ (Bajohr 2019, p. 171). 
This condition is, for Shklar, the articulation of experiences of injustice in a demo-
cratic system.
As a liberal, Shklar relies on the rule of law as a means of dealing with injustice. 
Yet she shares the non-ideal intuition that the mere establishment of the rule of law 
or ideal principles of justice is not sufficient. This is because, as Shklar argues, the 
boundary between misfortune and injustice is historically variable:
When is a disaster a misfortune and when is it an injustice? Intuitively the 
answer seems to be quite obvious. If the dreadful event is caused by the exter-
nal forces of nature, it is a misfortune and we must resign ourselves to our 
suffering. Should, however, some ill-intentioned agent, human or supernatu-
ral, have brought it about, then it is an injustice and we may express indigna-
tion and outrage. As it happens, in actual experience this distinction, to which 
we cling so fervently, does not mean very much. The reasons become clear 
enough when we recall that what is treated as unavoidable and natural, and 
what is regarded as controllable and social, is often a matter of technology or 
of ideology or interpretation. (Shklar 1990, p. 1)
 Hence, injustice cannot not be assessed independently of its historical context. 
It is precisely for this reason that ideal principles of justice are too rigid to grasp 
the complexity of political conflicts. This should not be understood as a relativist 
approach that makes injustice dependent on the dominant culture or ideology. What 
Shklar points out is that something that was a misfortune in the past (e.g. dying in an 
earthquake or of a disease) can become an injustice due to technological, medical, or 
social progress of protecting persons from existential risks.
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Considering its focus on injustice and on the respective circumstances of an 
unjust situation, Shklar’s approach mirrors the concern of non-ideal theory. Yet 
there is a crucial difference between these two approaches: non-ideal theory 
essentially remains dependent on Rawlsian methodology, which is why injustice 
in fact remains a secondary phenomenon. Shklar’s non-utopian approach, on the 
other hand, operates without recourse to an ideal theory; starting with the avoid-
ance of the summum malum hence opens up a perspective on injustice without 
having to take the detour of ideal theory.
For Shklar, the distinction between injustice and misfortune is made possible 
through the ‘sense of injustice’:
What, however, is the sense of injustice? First and foremost it is the special 
kind of anger we feel when we are denied promised benefits and when we 
do not get what we believe to be our due. It is the betrayal that we experi-
ence when others disappoint expectations that they have created in us. And 
it has always been with us. (Shklar 1990, p. 83)
 The sense of injustice mirrors the primary concept of fear as its empirical 
foundation:
For while we internalize the ethos of inequality and accept it as right and 
just, we do not lose our natural ability to feel deprived, humiliated and 
offended when our expectations as human beings are not met, when our 
claims are ignored, […]. And many of our expectations are rooted in nature, 
not in culture. (Shklar 1990, p. 87)
 Just like the primary notion of fear, the sense of injustice is hardwired into 
human nature and therefore not reducible to the given circumstances. And like 
fear, the sense of injustice has a secondary and political notion, too: ‘we are not 
only aroused on our own behalf but emphatically also when the indignities of 
injustice are experienced by other people. The sense of injustice is eminently 
political’ (Shklar 1990, p. 83). In its secondary, political dimension, the sense 
of injustice has a corrective function: ‘As long as we have a sense of injustice, 
we will want to understand not only the forces that cause us pain but also to hold 
them responsible for it’ (Shklar 1990, p. 5). In order to detect shifts from misfor-
tune to injustice, Shklar suggests taking seriously experiences of injustice. Her 
argument for proceeding in this way lies in the specific and unique knowledge 
that victims of injustice have:
The perceptions of the victims and those who, however remotely, might be 
victimizers tend to be quite different. Neither the facts nor their meaning 
will be experienced in the same way by the afflicted as by mere observers 
or by those who might have averted or mitigated the suffering. These people 
are too far apart to see things the same way. (Shklar 1990, p. 1)
 This specifically epistemological aspect of injustice has become a central aspect 
of the debate on injustice. In support of Shklar’s claim that victims of injustice 
have specific knowledge of injustice, e.g. Medina (2013) analyses the respective 
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epistemic capacities of persons belonging to socially marginalised vs. privileged 
groups. He argues that there are three epistemic virtues marginalised persons are 
more likely to possess, namely epistemic humility, curiosity, and open-minded-
ness; whereas persons occupying privileged social positions tend to develop epis-
temic vices, notably epistemic arrogance, laziness, and close-mindedness, which 
can result in ‘active ignorance’ (Medina 2013, pp. 27–55). The articulation of 
marginalised perspectives can lead to ‘epistemic friction’ (Medina 2013, p. 46) 
in the public sphere. Hence, the marginalised and the victims of injustice have 
‘knowledges from below’ (Medina 2011, p. 21), which can, in Shklar’s terms, 
eventually lead to a shift in the boundary between misfortune and injustice if they 
are taken seriously. The articulation of individual experiences of injustice can be 
a valuable resource for political change, which in turn can benefit other people 
besides the original ‘victim’ too. Paying attention and taking seriously experi-
ences of injustice can thus help remedy one type of epistemic injustice, namely 
‘testimonial injustice’ (Fricker 2007, p. 41), which she describes as the denial of 
proper credibility regarding the testimony of victims of injustice.
Despite these apparent benefits of the victim-centred approach on the epistemol-
ogy of injustice, it suffers from a crucial shortcoming: victims are neither always 
capable nor willing to identify themselves correctly. Two cases are conceivable: 
first, cases in which someone does not identify themselves as a victim of injustice 
in spite of their situation fulfilling criteria of injustice, and second, cases in which 
someone does believe that they have suffered or are suffering an injustice, in spite 
of there being no good reasons for this assumption. With Fricker, the first case is 
a case of ‘hermeneutical injustice’. Hermeneutical injustice consists in an agent’s 
inability to make sense of their own experiences due to a ‘gap in collective herme-
neutical resources’ (Fricker 2007, p. 6). For instance, ‘sexual harassment’ first had 
to be identified as a case of inappropriate behaviour, rather than counting as ‘flirt-
ing’ (ibid., pp. 152–153). The second case, in which persons see themselves as vic-
tims without there being any good reasons for this belief, has become increasingly 
important in the political sphere. This phenomenon is assumed to be one of the main 
reasons for the recent success of populism in Western democracies (Mueller 2016). 
Shklar’s victim-centred approach is unable to distinguish ‘legitimate’ grievances and 
expressions of injustice from the unjustified resentment and perceived injustice, for 
example of voters who feel that they are systematically disadvantaged through pro-
cesses of globalisation, and who blame the ‘liberal elites’ for their situation (Khazan 
2017). In light of these two cases, the assumption that the perspective of victims of 
injustice can contribute substantial insights on injustice becomes doubtful.
What the latter two cases highlight is the fact that the assessment of something 
as an injustice must depend on more than just the victims’ perspective, and that an 
independent standard is required. Starting from concrete experiences of injustice 
hence is a rather circular approach to understanding injustice. Yet, in spite of the 
challenge posed through the cases of victim-misidentification, a victim-centred per-
spective on injustice is more promising regarding the crucial problem that rigid the-
ories of justice entail: their insensitivity to the fact that the boundaries of injustice 
and misfortune are variable. Therefore, the pre-established grid of an ideal theory of 
justice might simply be too abstract and even lead to new instances of injustice when 
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it is applied to complex real-world injustice. If the boundaries between injustice and 
misfortune are variable, theories of justice are necessarily deficient tools for recog-
nising injustice. This is why Shklar claims that justice and injustice are asymmetri-
cal phenomena, and injustice consequently more than the mere absence of justice 
(see also Heinze 2017). Therefore, the liberalism of fear with its awareness of the 
conflictual character of the political is particularly sensitive to injustice: ‘Actually, 
the most reliable test for what cruelties are to be endured at any place at any time 
is to ask the likeliest victims, the least powerful persons, at any given moment and 
under controlled conditions’ (Shklar 1989, p. 35). Precisely because the asymmetry 
of the political always represents a reason for fear, the people occupying the weakest 
positions within the political community must be taken seriously.
In order to properly process the experiences of injustice, the liberalism of fear 
‘is monogamously, faithfully, and permanently married to democracy—but it is a 
marriage of convenience’ (Shklar 1989, p. 37). Only in a liberal democratic political 
system it is possible to publicly criticise public officials: ‘democracy does not fulfil 
its immanent promises quickly, but at least it does not silence the voices of protest, 
which it knows to be the herald of change’ (Shklar 1990, p. 8):
Without the institutions of representative democracy an accessible, fair, and 
independent judiciary open to appeals, and in the absence of a multiplicity of 
politically active groups, liberalism is in jeopardy. It is the entire purpose of 
the liberalism of fear to prevent that outcome. (Shklar 1989, p. 37)
 Shklar’s emphasis on the institutional setting in liberal democracies solves the 
problem of selection that a purely victim-centred approach would entail: the norma-
tive, universalist framework, the avoidance of the summum malum and of the ‘fear 
of fear’ remains in place in the institutionalised form of a liberal democracy under 
the guidance of the rule of law. Consequently, she does not advocate simply giving 
every self-proclaimed victim ‘their due’. In this respect, the liberalism of fear is con-
gruent with any other liberal theory. However, the non-utopian methodology enables 
the perspective on articulations of injustice and the voices ‘from below’, which must 
be heard and be given an open-minded evaluation, rather than presupposing univer-
sal consensus.
Yet there is an epistemic benefit from taking injustice as the starting point. In 
fact, injustice is taken to have hermeneutical priority over justice. This can be made 
plausible from the fact that the claim that something is unjust is made much more 
often than the judgement that something is just (see also Heinze 2017, p. 364; Mieth 
2005). Therefore, the critical as well as emancipatory potential of articulations of 
injustice should not be underestimated when it comes to identifying grievances that 
ought to be remedied. In this sense, the perspective on, or the ‘sense of’ injustice 
transcends theories of justice, since it can denounce and criticise theories of justice 
and their outcomes themselves (Mieth 2005, p. 66). This does not mean, however, 
that the sense of injustice leads directly into a theory of injustice. Rather, acknowl-
edging two distinct levels of thinking about justice and injustice explains Shklar’s 
‘asymmetry thesis’: that, first, justice and injustice are asymmetrical phenomena and 
second, injustice can only be insufficiently understood through the lens of a theory 
of justice. First of all, a theory of justice remains crucial for classifying situations or 
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actions as just or unjust. The criteria for this assessment need to come from a nor-
mative standard that is not taken from merely subjective, relative experience. This 
is why Shklar develops the normative principle of the avoidance of ‘fear of fear’, 
which is not something that results from an individual victim’s perspective but from 
a universal statement about power asymmetries in the political setting; and why she 
relies on democratic institutions for the assessment of individual claims. What the 
victims of injustice do know about, though, is the way in which injustice presents 
itself: the object(s) of fear and the means of cruelty can change depending on the 
respective historical circumstances. Without this universal normative standard, the 
identification and avoidance of cruelty and the fear of fear would become conceptu-
ally impossible. Therefore, rigid normative principles of justice and the unsystem-
atic sense of injustice can mutually inform each other, without their relation having 
to be symmetrical.
Realist Liberalism Reconsidered
The emphasis and reliance on liberal democratic institutions capable of distinguish-
ing legitimate from illegitimate articulations of grievances illustrate the limits of 
Shklar’s realism and non-utopianism. In spite of her scepticism regarding the estab-
lishment of rigid principles of justice, Shklar herself does employ a universal nor-
mative standard, namely the avoidance of the summum malum, i.e. the prevention of 
cruelty and the ‘fear of fear’. Although so far, I have argued for the independence of 
Shklar’s realist liberal approach from moral theory, not all realists will agree with 
this assessment. Original and fruitful as the negative approach of thinking about the 
summum malum is, it is, exactly like any conception of a summum bonum, some-
thing ‘on which people disagree’ (Sleat 2013, p. 103). The conception of a sum-
mum malum still stipulates consensus—an idea that contemporary realism rejects 
as an implausible assumption for any theory of the political. In this respect, Shklar’s 
approach is not that far from Rawls’s after all (see also Forrester 2012). Moreo-
ver, Shklar does make use of idealising assumptions—namely, that democratic 
institutions are reliable and impartial tools for detecting and remedying injustice. 
This idealised assumption can still be challenged on non-ideal theory’s grounds. 
The assumption that the democratic public is sufficiently unbiased and epistemi-
cally open-minded to listen to the voices of injustice’s victims is, to be sure, not 
something that reflects the ‘real’ world. Nevertheless, the liberalism of fear puts the 
voices of the victims on the agenda of liberal theorising. Its negative, non-utopian 
methodology and the context-sensitive principle of the ‘fear of fear’ render the liber-
alism of fear more responsive to grievances and conflict in the political sphere.
I have defended the liberalism of fear as a genuinely political liberal theory that 
is able to address political conflict and injustice, aspects that are criticised as being 
either missing or at least inadequately conceptualised in mainstream liberal theory. 
I have argued that it is a theory highly sensitive to the concerns of marginalised 
persons, and therefore a reinvigoration of liberalism’s emancipatory and progres-
sive thrust. In these respects, the liberalism of fear mirrors the concerns of realist 
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and non-ideal theory, while providing its own normative standard and hence avoid-
ing the normative dependence on ideal liberal theory that the two criticisms face. 
However, it is neither a fully realist nor a fully non-ideal theory, but because of its 
normative standard remains essentially a theory of liberalism. A liberal theory that 
takes seriously injustice and its victims is not interesting for merely methodological 
and conceptual purposes. Given the prevalence of conflict and ubiquity of injustice 
in the political world, the liberalism of fear can contribute to our understanding of 
liberalism as a political theory for the contemporary world.
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